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Abstract
Anything as revolutionary as World War I could not help but convulse the social order. Within each state the
sense of community induced by the common war effort did not survive into the postwar world, with its
tensions old and new. Demobilized soldiers, trained to fight, found it difficult to adjust themselves to civilian
life. The uncertainties of war, revolution, and economic instability undermined confidence among individuals,
classes, and states. Only in a very narrow sense did the armistice of 1918 bring peace. [excerpt]
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The Impact on Society (1919-1939) 
An^hiJig..,ji^.myolut ojiarj as help 
but^c-oavulse, the social order' Within each state the sense of 
community induced by the common war effort did not survive into 
the postwar world, with its tensions old and new. Demobilized 
soldiers, trained to fight, found it difficultJtq .adjust-them-
uncertainties of war, jrevol^ 
aiKi economic instability undermined confidence among_lndividuals, 
classes, and statesr""On^ very narrow sense did the armi-
sTice~"oT~ 1918 bring pe^ce„ 
Many traditional social anchors did not survive the war, or 
suo^iiSar"^5IyTl^i~gre^ly"M Provincial and reT igious 
foyai iiiAK retreated further before the demands of the nation-
state.. Age-oid" regimes and^dynasties disappeared. Traditional 
"class lines ha5"~l)een blurEejd'when womefT'oTgentle birth worked 
beside their workingclass sisters in munitions factories, while 
their menfolk shared the common, dangers of the trenches, jjax 
profiteers, fpmed a,jcJjass Qt '^ 
prising those who saw their inheritance^ and savings wiped out 
by war, taxation, and inflation. The latter group represented 
a grievous loss to Western Civilization because it was they who 
had once provided much of its managerial, professional, and in­
tellectual talent. Their thrift had accumulated much of its 
capital and their allegiance had given liberalism its vitality. 
Now, bitter and uncomprehending, the shabbily genteel were a 
potentially dangerous element in society. 
The steady expansion of urban centers continued. Thanks 
to cheap transportation, especially the street railway, the 
bus, and the automobile, the growth of Suburbia created a way 
of life which was neither urban nor rural. SiJon many workers 
had to spend more time going from their homes to offices and 
factories than their ancestors on the medieval manor had spent 
trudging to their strips in the three field system. 
Urbanization intensified that standardization of lif e  
which was a concomitant of mass produc11on. Ready-made clothes 
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of a uniform style gave a monotonous appearance to urban crowds. 
The movies, the radio, and the comic strip threatened to stand-
ardize entertainment as w^ll as more serious~~ineas~at 
acceptAbie to Ake^maximum number 61' peopTe , In"tfajs 
centiiry of the common man, heresy was difficult to sustainr 
One result of two world wars, when jobs for women were 
well-paid, socially respectable, and numerous, wa§.,the emanci­
pation of women from a number of traditional restrictions7 It  
is sar3~tBat wartime^elisTo'ns firsf made smoking fnr nr-
ceptable in polite societv« The question of votes for women 
n o w T T p n T t i o  W t m r i i l v  n n n  t f o v e r s i a T : "  T K 6 T " r 6 c e T v ' e a  t  
franchise in Britain in 1918 and^i&^S and (for federal elec­
tions) in the United States in 1920„ They were given the right 
to,, own and r.oTitrol^ jLtmlX-jamUjpxs^  ^ . Their s i^al relati^  ^
with_jaeji„were Placed on a free and more nearly equal basis, as 
illustrated by that symbol of the "roaring twenties," the flap­
per. Divorce laws bacame.. mQxa..Ienieiil„,aM.^^^^^^ rates rose. 
Scores of new gadgets and tcehtiig'ueo from mur .h of ,  
/the drudprp-ry r>f |ir>n<=!P>wn-rb- But emancipation led many to ex- | 
press alarm at the fact that with the restrictions also dis-/ 
appeared many of the protections which had been woman's tra^-
^ional right. 
In this world which was so truly revolutionary there were 
still many who hoped for and expected in 1918 a return to what 
President Warren G. Harding called normalcy. By this was meant 
a wosilxi—ia whii::jbt---4tae--fltes-t--desirable pre-1914 _values ^ nd insti-
tutlojais.„.p.ersisted^ Optimists, ignoring postwar reality, were 
encouraged by the apparent success with which a war fought by 
the Allies avowedly "to make the world safe for democracy" had 
indeed established numerous and supposedly democratic, repub­
lican, and independent nation-states, and a League of Nations. 
Especially in the United States, which tended to withdraw from 
European affairs, technological advances and the boom years of 
the 1920 s seemed to confirm their optimism, 
denwcrajcd^S. b^^ the n^ tntai i r'rfi-
t  ion of i  ntecnati  at i  nns in thp> 1 » c  
ogtJ,m.ists and seemed to confirm those who had hfipin passimi.«ts 
ever since the war„ Faith in the inevitability of progress 
received a body 1)1 ow which hurt all the more because the be­
lief that some sort of progress was possible was still widely 
^^1*^° politics, liberty received less attention than equal­
i t y ,  and in_jjQjbernaJJ.on,a^^^ in nat4-ojftal.-..aaIJ-
determination gavjLj^:££..JxL.-a-....a.ea  ^ national security. 
Along with disillusion came in many cases a lack of will ,  
ParticuTariy in ragaras to social questionsTmany men seemed to 
have lost the capacity to think things out afresh and then re-
dedicate themselves to the attainment of agreed goals. Rather, 
they seemed to await some cataclysm which they felt themselves 
helpless to avert or control„ 
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Much criticism was leveled at those...£XcaJ4>s--^icJ^ 
prpylded„lIiiaEfISISZrT'OT7Ficians™^^parties were accused of 
still fighting over issues of the last centuries, and with out­
moded weapons at that. Biographies and histories debunking men 
and movements enjoyed a large sale. A widely read book by a 
rrenchman, Julien Benda (1867-1956), entitled The Betrayal of 
the Intellectuals (1927) , accused intellprtnnls nf havlnp- de­
fer ted their--±raj5A^ioRa-l--«A-»s.ijQX^ by:--Jxtlaing the masses in exalt -
in^2l£3.^ilal-pa».'5ions-,-^lA§§^assion , and nsTFTonai passions^." " -
(TEBirsthought it signif icant~That*''tfie title of one of the most 
talked-about poems of the period was The Waste Land (1922), by 
an American expatriate, T. S. Eliot (18887"! 
A provocative expression of this malaise of the spirit was 
Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West, first published in 
Germany in 1918. ITthin the framework of a cyclical theony of 
hi stnry. Spengler interpreted the events of his day a^Jjnflicalr 
ing the inevitable and TmmihenT"~destriictioliTof WestexiLJCiA«ild 
tion. Many readers had the uneasy"jfeel^ was right 
when he predicted a collapse similar to that of GrecQ-Rpman 
Civilization, this time with the barbarians within the frontiers. 
